
      Monday, 03/7/2011 - 10:03 am by William Hogeland | 9 Comments              
Ordinary 18th-century Americans fought for fair access to small-scale credit and usable currencies. Big finance fought back.
 Calling modern banking “a widespread fraud,” Rob Burns wants to push the finance industry out of everyday lending.  A candidate for Congress in  the fourth district of Illinois, Burns proposes using federally insured  savings as a public fund for mortgages, student loans, consumer credit,  business bridge loans — the kind of borrowing engaged in by ordinary  Americans, not entrepreneurs.  On a different finance reform front, the  technology pioneer and culture critic Douglas Rushkoff has been  exploring complementary currencies.  Rushkoff envisions new monetary units, exchanged via handheld devices, helping to break what he calls “the money monopoly.”
 Far-reaching ideas for getting money, currency, and credit to flow  more democratically through the American economy would probably draw  all-purpose condemnations like “socialism!” from the rightists led by  Sarah Palin and Michele Bachmann.  Liberal high finance experts too  might find such proposals dangerously chaotic.  But regardless of  practicalities and politics, it’s useful to recognize that ideas like  Burns’ and Rushkoff’s have deep roots in the American founding period.   The Tea Party has done such a successful job  of associating anti-government, free-market politics with essential  American values — and historians have been so eager to ignore the  economic activism of ordinary, founding-era Americans in favor of  assessing and re-assessing the elite founders’ republican philosophies —  that it can be startling to confront the democratic theories about  popular finance that prevailed in 18th-century America.
 And “theories” is the right word.  People of the founding period put  forth their economic ideas in resolutions, petitions, and actions.  In  an earlier post in this series, I discussed traditional rioting in the context of struggles between American debtors and creditors.  Long before the Stamp Act  riots of Revolutionary fame, crowd action — rowdy, creepy, theatrical,  sometimes violent — played an important role in American social life.   Crowds dismissed by the upscale as “the mob” called their movements  “regulations.”  From the North Carolina Regulation of the 1760’s to Shays’ Rebellion of  the 1780’s and beyond, American debtors, barred from fair  representation in politics, engaged in obstruction, boycott, court  closing, jury nullification, building teardown, and physical  intimidation.  They wanted their legislatures to restrain the power of  wealth.
 Just like Rushkoff and Burns today, 18th-century popular regulators  focused on small-scale credit and readily negotiable currencies.   Scarcities of cash gave merchants a monopoly on gold and silver coin,  enabling them to dominate small farmers, artisans, and laborers through  loan shark-style lending terms: debtors, in constant danger of foreclosure,  could effectively become merchants’ laborers.  Hoping to elude the  money monopoly’s clutches, people looked to their colonial governments  to create “land banks,” where small operators could take small loans on  reasonable terms.  Spent by holders on purchases, land bank notes found  their way into circulation, becoming a kind of currency that at times  came even into the hands of the landless.
 Another thing governments could do: issue paper currency.  Government  notes represented amounts in metal; their value depended on people’s  belief that they’d be worth roughly what was printed on them.  A  commonplace of American history has it that early paper currencies  depreciated disastrously, but the reality is far more varied.  New  England had difficulty making paper finance work, but Pennsylvania  successfully alleviated economic crunches using both land banks and its  own paper.  The trick to encouraging confidence and controlling  depreciation was to issue limited amounts of the paper and then to  retire it through scheduled taxes, payable in the notes themselves.   Depreciation did occur, as it does today.  But popular finance activists  saw mild depreciation as a natural and democratic effect, benefiting  debtors.
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 Improvised popular currencies existed, too, complementary in  Rushkoff’s sense.  A craft commodity like whiskey — not a mere  instrument of barter but always exchangeable for gold somewhere down the  line — held value well.
 Merchant lenders, however, wanted to be paid in coin.  They wanted  the gold that, they believed, held perfect value in imperial trade and  which ordinary people could rarely come up with.  The people countered  by pressuring governments to make paper currencies legal tender, forcing  merchants to accept paper at face value for payments and principal — a  kind of government program to prevent foreclosure and debt peonage.   Lenders forced to take payments worth less, against gold, than when  loans were made disdained paper currencies as confiscatory, rotten,  mobbish, and vile, “the curse of pulp.”
 Lenders may actually have contributed to financial crises by  recoiling so violently from any hint of depreciation.  Yet their  philosophy had a certain consistency.  American merchants were already  calling the English government tyrannical for violating ancient rights  to security in property.  Now merchants feared that American  governments, vulnerable to what they saw as another kind of tyranny,  that of the mob, would take property in another way, through legal  tender legislation and state enforced devaluation.  The debtor class,  for its part, had little interest in what merchants defined as the big  picture.
 So even as the country moved toward climactic conflict with England, a  great social battle raged between American merchants and American  working people over credit and currency.  We’ve been distracted from  that battle’s significance by historians’ relentless focus on merchants’  frustration over Parliament’s trade acts.  Those acts included currency  laws, which restricted paper emissions in the colonies: sometimes  American merchants too had advocated issuing paper.  But merchants came  to hate paper’s democratizing, socially equalizing tendencies in  American society.  By the time American elites began relying on ordinary  people for help in opposing England — especially on the people’s  facility with organized protest! — working Americans’ desire for  economic, social, and political equality was driving the merchants’  anxiety to a nearly hysterical pitch.
 Our current financial crisis reflects those deep-seated American  economic disagreements, wired into events and philosophies that gave  birth to our country, were never resolved during that period, and  glossed over in certified stories of our origins for more than two  centuries.  Many people today, of various political persuasions, will  want to dismiss thinking like Rushkoff’s and Burns’, which goes far  beyond finance reform and asks fundamental questions about how, and for  whose benefit, we want credit and money to work in American society.  To  our little known 18th-century ancestors, the founding activists for  democratic finance, those questions would be among the most important we  could be asking.
 William Hogeland is the author of the narrative histories Declaration and The Whiskey Rebellion and a collection of essays, Inventing American History.     He has spoken on unexpected connections between history and politics    at the National Archives, the Kansas City Public Library, and various    corporate and organization events.  He blogs at http://www.williamhogeland.com.
 
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