Micah L. Sifry“In one direction we can reach out and touch the time when the  leaders of the Soviet Union thought that the explosion at the nuclear  reactor in Chernobyl could be kept secret from the rest of the world. In  the other direction we can see a time—already upon us—when  fourteen-year-old hackers in Australia or Newfoundland can make their  way into the most sensitive areas of national security or international  finance. The central concern of government in the future will not be  information, but analysis. We need government agencies staffed with  argumentative people who can live with ambiguity and look upon secrecy  as a sign of insecurity.”
         ——Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
            Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 1997   
“Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.”
         —Benjamin FranklinFor some time now, our leaders have been saying that they  understand—nay, that they embrace—the disruptive potential of the  Internet. Take President Obama, who used networked technology so  adroitly in his 2008 election campaign. Here he is talking about the  power of the Internet at a town hall meeting with students in Shanghai  in 2009, where he memorably declared:
I am a big believer in technology, and I’m a big  believer in openness when it comes to the flow of information. I think  that the more freely information flows, the stronger the society  becomes, because then citizens of countries around the world can hold  their own governments accountable. They can begin to think for  themselves. That generates new ideas. It encourages creativity.
 Obama added, “The truth is that because in the United States  information is free…I have a lot of critics in the United States who can  say all kinds of things about me. I actually think that that makes our  democracy stronger, and it makes me a better leader because it forces me  to hear opinions that I don’t want to hear.”
 Or take Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. No American official has  been more eloquent in expressing support for the power of the Internet  than Clinton, who gave a highly visible speech on “Internet freedom” on  January 21, 2010, in Washington, where she waxed poetic about how “the  spread of information networks is forming a new nervous system for our  planet,” adding:
 The Internet is a network that magnifies the power  and potential of all others. And that’s why we believe it’s critical  that its users are assured certain basic freedoms. Freedom of expression  is first among them. This freedom is no longer defined solely by  whether citizens can go into the town square and criticize their  government without fear of retribution. Blogs, e-mails, social networks  and text messages have opened up new forums for exchanging ideas, and  created new targets for censorship….
   Now, ultimately, this issue isn’t just about information freedom; it  is about what kind of world we want and what kind of world we will  inhabit. It’s about whether we live on a planet with one Internet, one  global community and a common body of knowledge that benefits and unites  us all, or a fragmented planet in which access to information and  opportunity is dependent on where you live and the whims of censors.
 The words are nice, but unfortunately theirs has been a kind of  bloodless embrace, a rhetorical gesture to a changing culture without  any real content and certainly no loss of control. Yes, as a candidate  Obama allowed his supporters to use his online social network,  my.BarackObama.com, to organize a 20,000-strong petition objecting to  his flip-flopping on the issue of warrantless wiretapping. But after an  e-mail response and a few hours of question-deflecting by his advisers  on his blog, the issue was dropped. Most politicians, including Obama,  have used the Internet to consolidate their power, not to empower others  for any other purpose.
 To be sure, they’ve been fascinated by the Internet’s potential to  challenge the status quo elsewhere. President Obama deftly used YouTube  to address the Iranian people directly at the beginning of his  administration, posting a message of friendship at the time of the  Nowruz (springtime) celebrations that, according to YouTube’s open  tracking analytics, was indeed widely watched inside Iran. And  administration officials like Clinton have spoken out often in defense  of bloggers’ free speech rights, and condemned countries like China,  Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, Uzbekistan and Vietnam for clamping down on the  Internet and cracking down on human rights activists using online social  network platforms.
 But the reason the recent confrontation between WikiLeaks and the US  government is a pivotal event is that, unlike these other applications  of technology to politics, this time the free flow of information is  threatening the establishment with difficult questions. And not by  embarrassing one politician or bureaucrat but by exposing systemic  details of how America conducts its foreign and military policies. Or,  as writer Bruce Sterling memorably put it, “Julian Assange has hacked a  superpower.” The result is a series of deeply uncomfortable  contradictions.
 The idea that the wondrous “new nervous system” for the planet that  Clinton saw being created by all this online freedom might want to turn  its attention to the most powerful country on the planet shouldn’t be a  shock to leaders like her. But when the State Department cables started  to leak, she fell back on a much older way of seeing the world. “The  United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified  information,” she said in her prepared statement the day the news broke.  “It puts people’s lives in danger, threatens our national security and  undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared  problems.” She added later, “Disclosures like these tear at the fabric  of the proper function of responsible government.” The notion that lying  to the American public, or the world, about the conduct of foreign or  military policy might be more damaging to the fabric of international  relations or to the functioning of responsible government was not  addressed.
 ‘You Can’t Handle the Truth’? 
 Here is Clinton’s problem: in the networked age, when the watched can  also be the watchers, nothing less than the credibility of authority  itself is at stake. Western governments presumably rest on the consent  of the governed, but only if the governed trust the word of those who  would govern them. In this changed environment, the people formerly  known as the authorities can re-earn that trust only by being more  transparent, and by eliminating the contradictions between what they say  and what they do. Compounding this challenge, today when a crisis  strikes, information moves faster than the “authorities” can know using  their own, slower methods. WikiLeaks, and other channels for the  unauthorized release and spread of information, are symptoms of this  change, not its cause.
 Unfortunately there is a large gap between what American officials  have told the public about their actions and what they have actually  done. Transparency may be the best medicine for a healthy democracy, but  from the government’s perspective, the problem with the WikiLeaks  revelations from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, plus the State  Department cables, may well be that they expose too much. Not in the  sense of giving away military secrets that endanger troops in the field  or human rights workers; so far both the Pentagon and the State  Department have explicitly admitted that no such harm has occurred  (though the original release of the Afghanistan war records may have  placed some civilian informants in danger from the Taliban).
 Rather, the war logs and diplomatic cables show that the nine-year  war in Afghanistan is doomed. And this is not something the governments  fighting that war want to tell their public. As Javier Moreno, editor of  El PaÃs, wrote in a long essay explaining why his paper decided to work  with WikiLeaks in publishing the State Department cables,
  Tens of thousands of soldiers are fighting a war in Afghanistan that  their respective leaders know is not winnable. Tens of thousands of  soldiers are shoring up a government known around the world to be  corrupt, but which is tolerated by those who sent the soldiers there in  the first place. The WikiLeaks cables show that none of the Western  powers believes that Afghanistan can become a credible nation in the  medium term, and much less become a viable democracy, despite the stated  aims of those whose soldiers are fighting and dying there. Few people  have been surprised to learn that the Afghan president has been salting  away millions of dollars in overseas aid in foreign bank accounts with  the full cognizance of his patrons.
 
 He added, “We may have suspected our governments of underhand  dealings, but we did not have the proof that WikiLeaks has provided. We  now know that our governments were aware of the situations mentioned  above, and, what is more, they have hidden the facts from us.”
 Instead of an honest discussion about what the war logs and cables  tell us in toto, we have been treated to a bizarre and contradictory set  of responses. Sometimes, what Julian Assange has done is portrayed as  worse than what Al Qaeda has done. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich:  “He should be treated as an enemy combatant and WikiLeaks should be  closed down permanently and decisively.” And other times, we are told  that the so-called revelations are actually pretty humdrum. Defense  Secretary Robert Gates: “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes.  Consequences for US foreign policy? I think fairly modest.” Nothing to  see here; move along please.
 There is only one way to reconcile these seemingly contradictory  messages coming from the government and its allies in Congress and the  media. At some fundamental level, they probably understand that the  conditions for maintaining their monopoly on critical information have  been broken. But they apparently still hope that the next Bradley  Manning, the alleged leaker, will be dissuaded from an act of conscience  if he believes either that the personal cost will be too high or that  his actions won’t make a difference. Of course, neither approach will  work, as long as millions of other government employees have access to  the information the government is trying to hide. The Age of  Transparency is here not because of one transnational online network  dedicated to open information and whistleblowing named WikiLeaks but  because the knowledge of how to build and maintain such networks is  widespread.
he End of Secrecy 
Let’s posit that what Assange is doing is “radical transparency,” i.e.,  publishing everything he can get his hands on. He has not, in fact, been  doing that, though he is obviously publishing a great deal of raw  material. Given that the Internet is a realm of abundance—not scarcity,  like the old ink- and airtime-based media—this is a feature, not a bug.  Raw-data dumps of previously private or secret information are now part  of the media landscape. As Max Frankel, former executive editor of the  New York Times, recently put it, “The threat of massive leaks will  persist so long as there are massive secrets.”
Security expert Bruce Schneier makes a similar point. “Secrets are  only as secure as the least trusted person who knows them,” he wrote on  his blog a few weeks after Cablegate erupted. “The more people who know a  secret, the more likely it is to be made public.” Somewhere between  500,000 and 600,000 military and diplomatic personnel had access to the  SIPRNet system that Bradley Manning is alleged to have tapped. The  government doesn’t know precisely how many people overall have security  clearances to classified information. Based on reporting from the  Government Accountability Office, Steven Aftergood, a secrecy expert,  estimates that this number is 2.5 million.
 In other words, since this kind of “radical transparency” is  technologically feasible, like it or not, it is a given. Efforts to stop  it will fail, just as efforts to stop file-sharing by killing Napster  failed. As Schneier sagely points out, “Just as the music and movie  industries are going to have to change their business models for the  Internet era, governments are going to have to change their secrecy  models. I don’t know what those new models will be, but they will be  different.”
 Fourteen years ago, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan led the  bipartisan Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Its  recommendations are worth revisiting in light of WikiLeaks. “It is time  for a new way of thinking about secrecy,” the commission’s report  began. “Secrecy is a form of government regulation. Americans are  familiar with the tendency to over-regulate in other areas. What is  different with secrecy is that the public cannot know the extent or the  content of the regulation.” The Moynihan Commission was examining a  condition not unlike that of the present day, where millions of people  had security clearances and hundreds of thousands of new “top secret”  documents, whose disclosure could presumably cause “exceptionally grave  damage to the national security,” were created each year. But the  commission was convinced that the culture of secrecy was out of control  and hurting the country:
  Excessive secrecy has significant consequences for the national  interest when, as a result, policymakers are not fully informed,  government is not held accountable for its actions, and the public  cannot engage in informed debate. This remains a dangerous world; some  secrecy is vital to save lives, bring miscreants to justice, protect  national security, and engage in effective diplomacy. Yet as Justice  Potter Stewart noted in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, when  everything is secret, nothing is secret. Even as billions of dollars are  spent each year on government secrecy, the classification and personnel  security systems have not always succeeded at their core task of  protecting those secrets most critical to the national security. The  classification system, for example, is used too often to deny the public  an understanding of the policymaking process, rather than for the  necessary protection of intelligence activities and other highly  sensitive matters.
 
 Well before Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and thumb-size memory sticks,  Moynihan foresaw that the information age would make the culture of  government secrecy untenable, even picturing a time “when  fourteen-year-old hackers in Australia or Newfoundland” could penetrate  the government’s most sensitive secrets. With his commission, mandated  by an act of Congress, he tried to turn the paradigm on its head. “The  great discovery of Western science, somewhere in the seventeenth  century,” he wrote, “was the principle of openness. A scientist who  judged he had discovered something, published it. Often to great  controversy, leading to rejection, acceptance, modification, whatever.  Which is to say, to knowledge. In this setting science advanced, as  nowhere else and never before.”
 It is long past time for governments to embrace this paradigm. “Where  you’re open, things will not be WikiLeaked,” says Christopher Graham,  Britain’s information minister. “Quite a lot of this is only exciting  because we didn’t know it.” He adds, “The best form of defense is  transparency—much more proactive publication of what organizations do.  It’s an attitude of, ‘OK. You want to know? Here it is.’” Jeff Jarvis, a  professor at the City University of New York Journalism School, argues  that government should be transparent by default, and have to justify  when it chooses to make something secret, not the reverse. And he, too,  sees something positive in the impact of WikiLeaks. “Perhaps the lesson  of WikiLeaks should be that the open air is less fearsome than we’d  thought,” he blogged. “That should lead to less secrecy. After all, the  only sure defense against leaks is transparency.”
 People who think more transparency will lead only to the hiding of  secrets deeper in the bureaucracy, or that it will prevent government  officials from conducting any kind of meaningful business, and that as a  result we will know less, not more, about the workings of government or  the powerful should think again. By that logic, we should require less  public disclosure, not more. Why ask campaign contributors or lobbyists  to disclose any of their activities? In fact, when people think what  they’re doing is subject to public view, their behavior generally  changes for the better. Thus Cablegate—which exposed many sovereign  powers to a new level of public scrutiny, warning them that more such  scrutiny is always a possibility in the future—should, on balance, lead  to better behavior. Why? Because the cost of maintaining the  contradictions between what you say in public and what you do really has  just gone up another notch.
 Carne Ross is a British diplomat who resigned his post at the United  Nations over the dissimulation that his government practiced during the  lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. “From now on, it will be ever  more difficult for governments to claim one thing and do another,” says  Ross. “For in making such claims, they are making themselves vulnerable  to WikiLeaks of their own.” If all it takes is one person with a USB  drive, the “least trusted person” whose conscience may be pricked by a  contradiction in his or her government’s behavior, that information can  move into public view more easily than ever before. That is the reality  of the twenty-first century. It would be far better for all of us if our  governments and other powerful institutions got with the business of  accepting that transparency will be a new fact of life, and take steps  to align their words with their deeds. In that respect, Hillary Clinton  should thank Julian Assange rather than apologize to world leaders for  what he did.
 Judging from another “Internet freedom” speech Clinton gave in the  wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, a new era of openness and  candor is not upon us. She declared America’s support for the “freedom  to connect” online “to solve shared problems and expose public  corruption,” and she insisted that “governments also have a duty to be  transparent,” but insisted that WikiLeaks could somehow be walled off  from these principles because it “began with an act of theft.”  “Government documents were stolen, just the same as if they had been  smuggled out in a briefcase,” she declared, as if that meant the  information in those documents was somehow unfit for public consumption  or discussion simply because they weren’t leaked in the proper way, say  to Bob Woodward. For someone who has tried to be an Internet  progressive, it was a singularly ostrichlike move. And unfortunately for  Clinton and all the other world leaders, burying your head in the sand  doesn’t make bottom-up transparency disappear.
 Two, Three, Many Leaks 
 That’s because the genie has escaped from the bottle. Whatever else  you may say about Assange, his greatest contribution to global  enlightenment is the idea of a viable “stateless news organization,” to  use Jay Rosen’s phrase, beholden to no country’s laws and dedicated to  bringing government information into public view. Even if Assange—who  has just lost round one of his fight to avoid extradition to Sweden to  face rape charges—goes to jail and WikiLeaks is somehow shut down,  others are already following in his footsteps. Or as futurist Mark Pesce  nicely put it, “The failures of WikiLeaks provide the blueprint for the  systems which will follow it.”
 Since Cablegate, several independent WikiLeaks-style projects have  announced themselves, including: BrusselsLeaks.com (focused on the  European Union); BalkanLeaks.eu (the Balkan countries); Indoleaks.org  (Indonesia); Rospil.info (Russia); two competing environmental efforts,  each claiming the name GreenLeaks; and the Al-Jazeera Transparency Unit,  which in January began publishing (with the Guardian) a cache of  documents from inside the Palestinian Authority that exposed the minutes  of high-level PA negotiating sessions with Israel and the United  States. Some recent graduates of the CUNY Journalism School launched a  simple tool, Localeaks, for publishers interested in attracting  whistleblowers. And even the New York Times announced it may create a  special portal for would-be leakers.
 Perhaps the most important of these fledgling efforts is  OpenLeaks.org, which is being built by Daniel Domscheit-Berg, Herbert  Snorrason and other former WikiLeaks associates. Of all these efforts,  OpenLeaks is most likely to have the technological and cryptographic  skills needed to succeed in a world filled with shady actors opposed to  transparency. And unlike WikiLeaks, it is designed to be decentralized.
 In mid-December, Domscheit-Berg told me that OpenLeaks was trying to  correct mistakes in the WikiLeaks approach. “I am not into being a  leader, and I don’t trust the whole concept of leaders either,” he said,  adding, “If you follow the debate around why we left the WL [WikiLeaks]  project, you will find that a strikingly important detail.” He  described OpenLeaks as more of a technological service provider to many  media organizations, as well as others with an interest in opening up  information, like NGOs and labor unions. Instead of acting as a central  hub for leaks, it will provide a dedicated website for handling leaks to  each entity. In his view, this approach has several advantages:
  Firstly, the system will scale better with each new participant.  Secondly, the source is the one that will have a say in who should  exclusively be granted first access to material, while also ensuring  that material will be distributed to others in the system after a period  of exclusive access. Thirdly, we will make use of existing resources,  experience, manpower etc [to] deal with submissions more efficiently.  Fourthly, we will be able to deliver information more directly to where  it matters and will be used, while remaining a neutral service  ourselves. And last but not least, this approach will create a large  union of shared interests in the defense of the rights to run an  anonymous post-drop in the digital world.
 
 Of course, we can’t take for granted that the powers that be will let  this happen without a fight. In that respect, the battle over WikiLeaks  has had another salutary effect: it has delivered a wake-up call to  everyone who thought the free and open Internet was a settled fact.  Freedom of the press is no longer the exclusive province of those who  own one, but while the Internet has drastically lowered the barriers to  entry into the public sphere, it has not eliminated them. Right now,  unpopular or disruptive speech online will probably exist in a twilight  zone, semi-free, sometimes capable of threatening powerful institutions  and other times subject to their whims. What’s needed is much more  robust discussion of how the Internet can become a genuinely free public  arena, a global town square where anyone can speak. Or, to be more  precise, an Internet whose underlying architecture is really free of  government or corporate control, as decentralized and uncontrollable as  life itself.
 This essay is adapted from Micah Sifry’s new book, WikiLeaks and the Age of Transparency.